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Comment
MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBE V. TOWN OF LEDYARD:
THE PREEMPTION OF STATE TAXES UNDER BRACKER,
THE INDIAN TRADER STATUTES, AND THE INDIAN
GAMING REGULATORY ACT
EDWARD A. LOWE
The Indian Tribes of the United States occupy an often ambiguous
place in our legal system, and nowhere is that ambiguity more pronounced
than in the realm of state taxation. States are, for the most part, preempted
from taxing the Indian Tribes, but something unique happens when the
state attempts to levy a tax on non-Indian vendors employed by a Tribe for
work on a reservation. The state certainly has a significant justification for
imposing its tax on non-Indians, but at what point does the non-Indian
vendor’s relationship with the Tribe impede the state’s right to tax? What
happens when the taxed activity is a sale to the Tribe? And what does it
mean when the taxed activity has connections to Indian Gaming?
This Comment explores three preemption standards as they were
interpreted by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in a case between the
State of Connecticut and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe. In deciding
whether preemption was the legally required outcome, the Court looked to
and applied the landmark preemption analysis case White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the Indian Trader Statutes, and the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act. While more than one legally correct outcome
exists in this case, this Comment endorses and argues in favor of
preemption based on the application of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
and the preemption analysis required by Bracker.
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MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBE V. TOWN OF LEDYARD:
THE PREEMPTION OF STATE TAXES UNDER BRACKER,
THE INDIAN TRADER STATUTES, AND THE INDIAN
GAMING REGULATORY ACT
EDWARD A. LOWE∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government has the power to regulate commerce with the
Indian Tribes,1 and throughout most of the nineteenth century, Congress
participated in that exclusive relationship as one nation would with any
other sovereign entity—through the signing and ratification of treaties.
These treaties, despite being disproportionately in favor of the United
States,2 formed the basis for the treatment of the Indian Tribes as
“domestic dependent nations”3 for almost a hundred years.4
∗

Eastern Connecticut State University, B.S. 2010; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D.
Candidate 2015. I would like to thank Professors Richard Pomp and Betsy Conway for suggesting this
Comment topic to me and offering their insights and advice, the editors of the Connecticut Law Review
for their thoughtful editing, and, most of all, my beautiful wife, Beverly, who inspires me every day.
All errors contained herein are mine alone.
1
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” Id. This assignment of power is
collectively known as the Commerce Clause, and as the Foreign Commerce Clause, Interstate
Commerce Clause, and Indian Commerce Clause individually.
2
See, e.g., A Treaty of Perpetual Friendship, Cession and Limits, U.S.-Choctaw Nation, Sept. 27,
1830, 7 Stat. 333 [hereinafter the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek]. The Treaty of Dancing Rabbit
Creek required the Choctaw to cede their lands east of the Mississippi River to the United States, and
remove themselves to what is now Oklahoma. Id. This was one of the treaties that initiated the forced
removal of Indian Tribes mandated by the Indian Removal Act, the Act responsible for the Trail of
Tears. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (“[F]or an exchange of lands with the Indians residing
in any of the states or territories, and for their removal west of the river Mississippi.”).
3
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (“Though the Indians are
acknowledged to have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy,
until that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our government; yet it may well be
doubted whether those tribes which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States
can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps, be
denominated domestic dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a title
independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their right of possession
ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian.”) (emphasis added).
4
Congress ended its policy of regulating the Indian Tribes through treaties in 1871. See Indian
Apportionment Act of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2012))
(“[H]ereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as
an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty.”).
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Ever since Congress chose to end its policy of making treaties with the
Indian Tribes, states have been permitted to exercise increased authority in
the taxation of non-Indian activity within Indian country.5 Nevertheless,
the authority of a state to impose a tax in Indian country is narrow, and for
the most part, states lack the authority to tax Tribe members in Indian
country without either the authorization of Congress or the permission of
the Tribe. Of course, as this Comment will demonstrate, the ability of a
state to tax even non-Indian activity within Indian country can be, and
frequently is, preempted by the existence of federal law that specifically
targets that activity.
Federal laws restrict the states from engaging in several different
interactions with Indian Tribes. One such federal restriction, formed by a
series of laws collectively known as the Indian Trader Statutes,6 has been
interpreted to forbid the imposition of state sales taxes on certain
transactions involving reservation Indians. The Supreme Court of the
United States determined as much in Warren Trading Post v. Arizona State
Tax Commission,7 which asserted that the Indian Trader Statutes were
“sufficient to show that Congress has taken the business of Indian trading
on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for state laws
imposing additional burdens upon traders.”8 As the interpretation of these
statues evolved, it was concluded that the simple existence of the Indian
Trader Statutes “pre-empts the field of transactions with Indians occurring
on reservations,” even in cases not involving federally licensed Indian
traders.9
Indian Tribes that are fortunate enough to participate in an Indian
5
See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (“State sovereignty does not end at a
reservation’s border. Though tribes are often referred to as ‘sovereign’ entities, it was ‘long ago’ that
‘the Court departed from Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of a State can have no force’
within reservation boundaries.”) (citations omitted).
6
25 U.S.C. §§ 261–64 (2012). Popularly referred to as the “Indian Trader Statutes,” these laws
were enacted to “protect Indians from becoming victims of fraud in dealings with persons selling
goods.” Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980). The Indian Trader
Statutes have been rightly described as

paternalistic and resented by many Indians and their supporters as reflecting the
“guardian/ward relationship which places the federal government in the role of
protector and the tribal members in a subordinated position requiring protection. By
contrast, an analysis that includes considerations of tribal sovereignty places needed
emphasis on the simple fact that a tribe is a government within the federal system
and that its governmental integrity is worthy of consideration and encouragement.”
Richard D. Pomp, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Indian Commerce Clause and State Taxation, 63 TAX
LAW. 897, 1009 n.434 (2010) (quoting Scott A. Taylor, A Judicial Framework for Applying Supreme
Court Jurisprudence to the State Income Taxation of Indian Traders, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 841, 862
(2007)).
7
380 U.S. 685 (1965).
8
Id. at 690.
9
Cent. Mach. Co., 448 U.S. at 165.
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gaming industry on their reservations have additional cause to challenge
any state taxes that target their gaming operations. The federal government
has a clear interest in regulating the gaming operations and economic
development of the Indian Tribes. It was from this interest that the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act10 (IGRA) was born. In addition to regulating
Indian gaming, the IGRA prohibits the states from levying taxes on Indian
gaming operations in Indian country without Tribal consent.11
Looming over every modern controversy concerning the exertion of
state authority over non-Indian activity in Indian country is the preemption
analysis laid out in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,12 which calls
for the relevant federal, state, municipal, and Tribal interests at issue to be
evaluated to determine whose interest is strongest, and therefore valid.13
The preemption of a state tax imposed on a non-Indian contractor can only
be realized through a Bracker test. The Indian Trader Statutes and IGRA
weigh heavily in favor of the federal interest in their applicable cases.
In Connecticut, a state that has often sought to exercise varying levels
of authority over the Tribes within its borders,14 each municipality is
responsible for collecting a property tax levied on the non-exempt tangible
property within its jurisdiction.15 Leased property is included in the town’s
assessment, with the tax burden falling on the owner of the property.16 The
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe owns and operates the Foxwoods Resort
10

25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–21 (2012).
See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (2012) (“Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian
lands upon which a class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall request the
State in which such lands are located to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a TribalState compact governing the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the State
shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.”).
12
448 U.S. 136 (1980).
11

13

We have . . . rejected the proposition that in order to find a particular state law to
have been pre-empted by operation of federal law, an express congressional
statement to that effect is required. At the same time any applicable regulatory
interest of the State must be given weight, and “automatic exemptions ‘as a matter
of constitutional law’” are unusual. . . . This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical
or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a
particularized inquiry into the nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake,
an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the exercise of
state authority would violate federal law.
Id. at 144–45 (citations omitted).
14
See infra Part II.A (concerning cases involving the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and
Connecticut).
15
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 12-40–12-121z (2014).
16
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 12-57a(a) (2014) (“Any personal property subject to a contract of
lease . . . which property is in the possession of the lessee on any assessment day in the municipality in
which the lessee resides, shall, for information purposes only, be included in the personal property
declaration of the lessee . . . . [T]he lessee shall be required to include the name and address of the
owner of such property and the term of the lease applicable thereto.”) (emphasis added).
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Casino on the Mashantucket Pequot Reservation near the town of Ledyard,
Connecticut.17 The casino hosts several games of chance, including over
five thousand slot machines;18 many of which are leased from a handful of
non-Indian gaming companies.19 Connecticut’s generally applied property
tax would ordinarily be levied on these slot machines and be paid by the
lessors, but the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe argues that the exclusive use of
the leased slot machines for Indian gaming on their Reservation preempts
the state’s property tax.20
The preemptive power of the Indian Trader Statutes, the IGRA, and the
Bracker analysis were put to the test in the case that is the subject of this
Comment: Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard.21 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals was unmoved by the Tribe’s preemption
argument, holding that the state and municipal interest in enforcing the
property tax outweighed any Tribal or federal interest.22 This was a notable
divergence from the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut’s ruling, which found the tax to be preempted under the
Bracker analysis, the IGRA, and the Indian Trader Statutes.23 It seems at
first blush that there is a reasonable justification for both rulings. After all,
both courts are presided over by some of the most intelligent legal minds
of our time, but did either court get it right in the end? Does precedent

17
The location of the Reservation is usually referred to as either near or in Ledyard. The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals has previously described Foxwoods Resort Casino as being in Ledyard, CT.
E.g., Connecticut v. Dep’t. of Interior, 228 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 2000). For their part, the Tribe
advertises the Foxwoods Resort Casino address as Mashantucket, CT. See Getting Here, FOXWOODS,
http://www.foxwoods.com/gettinghere.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). Of course, the uncertainty of
Connecticut’s authority to tax non-Indian property on the Reservation attests to the idea that the
Reservation is not only separate from the town of Ledyard, but from the state of Connecticut as well.
18
Slots, FOXWOODS, http://www.foxwoods.com/slots.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
19
The Tribe could more likely than not avoid a property tax completely by buying the slot
machines, but many of the most popular “themed” slot machines are available by lease only. See Brief
for the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe at 12, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d
457 (2d Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-1727, 12-1735).
20
See infra Part II.B (describing the background of the Tribe’s complaint and their argument).
21
722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013) [hereinafter Pequot III]. The state appealed from Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012)
(Eginton, J.) [hereinafter Pequot II]. An additional action between the Tribe and the State,
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2007 WL 1238338 (D. Conn. Apr.
25, 2007) (Eginton, J.) [hereinafter Pequot I], in which the district court denied the State’s motion to
dismiss the case on comity and Tax Injunction Act grounds, is referred to as Pequot I in the Pequot III
opinion. For the sake of uniformity, the shortened names given to the cases in Pequot III are identical
in this Comment.
22
Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 477 (“[T]he district court erred in determining that Connecticut’s
generally-applicable personal property tax was barred by the Indian Trader Statutes, by IGRA, and
pursuant to the Bracker test.”).
23
Pequot II, 2012 WL 1069342 at *12 (“The motion for summary judgment will be granted in
favor of the Tribe. The motions for summary judgment filed by the State and the Town will be
denied.”).
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dictate a single correct outcome to this controversy? Wuyeepuyôq, and
welcome to that nebulous area where state taxation, the Indian Tribes, and
federal preemption intersect.
This Comment will analyze the decisions made in both the District
Court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and the courts’ applications
of the Indian Trader Statutes, the IGRA, and the Bracker preemption
analysis. In Part II, this Comment discusses the recent history of the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, the creation of the Foxwoods Resort Casino,
and the series of events that led to the Tribe’s initial challenge. In Part III,
this Comment summarizes the background, modern interpretation, and
application of the three major preemption standards at issue in Pequot II
and Pequot III.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe’s Modern History
The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe was recognized by the federal
government in 198325 and is currently one of two federally recognized
Tribes in Connecticut.26 With their recognition, the Tribe was also granted
24
The phrase, pronounced “wee-ee-PEE-on-kwa” and meaning “come in a good way,” was the
salutation of the Pequot Tribe, the historical predecessors of the modern Mashantucket Pequot Tribe.
THE MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION, http://www.mashantucket.com (last visited
Sept. 24, 2014).
25
Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 98-134, 97 Stat. 851 (1983)
[hereinafter the Settlement Act] (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1751–60 (2012)).
26
The Mohegan Tribe is the other federally recognized tribe in the state. Mohegan Nation of
Connecticut Land Claims Settlement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-377, 108 Stat. 3501 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1775–75h (2012)). During the Pequot War, fought between 1634 and 1638,
the Mohegan allied with Connecticut colonists against the Pequot. The war ended with what was
essentially the destruction of the Pequot Tribe. Most of the Pequot were killed, and the survivors were
either taken in by local tribes or enslaved. 15 BRUCE G. TRIGGER, HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN
INDIANS, Northeast at 172–73 (8th ed., 1978). The current Chairman of the Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe, Rodney Butler, reported that “[t]here’s still some bad blood over [the Mohegan alliance with the
colonists], a little animosity, but mostly, we recognize them as our cousins, and we work well
together.” Michael Sokolove, A Big Bet Gone Bad, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2012, at MM36. Today, the
two tribes continue their rivalry on friendlier terms as competitors in the gaming industry. The
Mashantucket Pequot and Mohegan Tribes own and operate Foxwoods Resort Casino and Mohegan
Sun respectively, the two largest casinos in the Western hemisphere. Id. The slot machine lessors to the
Mohegan Tribe, which include AC Coin and WMS, consistently pay the Connecticut property tax
levied on slot machines leased to the Mohegan Tribe. Brief for the Town of Ledyard, Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe v. Town of Ledyard, 722 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-1727), 2012 WL 3548136, at
*7 (“ACC and WMS pay Montville taxes assessed on slot machines that they lease to the Mohegan Sun
Casino, but at the urging of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, resist paying taxes to Ledyard on slot
machines they lease to the Gaming Enterprise for use at Foxwoods.”).
Two additional Connecticut Tribes had previously enjoyed federal recognition, albeit very briefly
as their recognition was successfully challenged by the state of Connecticut at a time when gambling
expansion in the state was a major political issue. The Schaghticoke Tribe was granted federal
recognition in 2004, only to have that recognition reconsidered and rescinded a year later after
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a settlement fund to purchase more than eight-hundred acres from
landowners within a defined area around the Reservation to be taken in
trust by the United States on behalf of the Tribe.27 As a newly recognized
sovereign entity, the Tribe quickly created a system of governance, which
included its own post office, fire department, police department, and the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court.28 Shortly after achieving federal
recognition, the Tribe opened a bingo hall on the Reservation without first
seeking regulatory approval from the state.29 Connecticut objected,
Connecticut successfully argued that the Schaghticoke Tribe did not meet the criteria for administrative
recognition. See Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Kempthorne, 587 F. Supp. 2d 389, 421–22 (D. Conn.
2008) (Dorsey, J.) (holding that the “Reconsidered Final Determination” of the Department of the
Interior was not arbitrary or the result of political influence by the state of Connecticut). The Eastern
Pequot Tribe, which, similar to the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, traces its heritage back to the historic
Pequot Tribe, was granted federal recognition in 2002 only to have recognition similarly rescinded in
2005 after Connecticut again successfully argued that the Tribe failed to meet the requirements for an
administrative recognition. The Interior Board of Indian Appeals determined that the Eastern Pequot
Tribe did not meet the federal guidelines for recognition because the Tribe divided “into two groups in
the early 1980s. . . . [and as such] are not the same community that existed before that time” and
because “there was insufficient evidence of political authority or influence for the period 1913–1973.”
Press Release, Department of the Interior, The Department of the Interior Issued Reconsidered Final
Determination to Decline Federal Acknowledgment of the Eastern Pequot Indians of Connecticut and
the Paucatuck Eastern Pequot Indians of Connecticut (Oct. 12, 2005) available at
http://www.doi.gov/news/archive/05_News_Releases/051012.htm. The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
achieved its recognition through the political, rather than administrative, process by appealing to
Congress directly for recognition. Even the political process of recognition proved difficult, and
resulted in a Presidential Veto in its initial attempt. Mashantucket Pequot Indian Claims Settlement
Bill, Veto Message, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 503-04 at 1–2 (Apr. 5, 1983) (“[T]he Tribe may
not meet the standard requirements for Federal recognition or services that are required of other tribes.
The Federal Government has never entered into treaties with this Tribe, and the Bureau of Indian
Affairs has never provided services to them or exercised jurisdiction over any Indian lands in
Connecticut. . . . Extending Federal recognition to the Tribe would bypass the Department of the
Interior’s administrative procedures that apply a consistent set of eligibility standards in determining
whether or not Federal recognition should be extended to Indian groups.”).
27
25 U.S.C. § 1754 (2012).
28
The History of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court, THE MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN)
PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION, http://www.mashantucket.com/mptntchistory.aspx (last visited Sept. 24,
2014). The first opinion rendered by the court, Lefevre v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 1 Mash. Rep. 1,
23 Ind. L. Rep. 6018 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. 1992), involved a slip and fall injury that
occurred in the Reservation’s bingo hall in 1988, several years before the creation of the Tribal Court
system. The case was previously dismissed from both the Connecticut state and federal district courts
for lack of jurisdiction, and while the decision by the federal district court essentially deprived the
plaintiffs of a venue at a time when the Tribal Court did not exist, “the court’s decision, as harsh as it
appears, is grounded in solid precedent and is consistent with federal policy that intrusions by federal
courts upon tribal sovereignty be limited.” Edmond F. Leedham, III, The Indian Gaming Controversy
in Connecticut: Forging a Balance Between Tribal Sovereignty and State Interests, Note, 13
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 649, 681 (1993). Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal
Court also dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because the injury occurred before the creation of
the court. Lefevre, 1 Mash. Rep. at 5. Apparently, there was simply no venue for the plaintiffs in this
unfortunate case.
29
Leedham, supra note 28, at 670 (“In February 1985, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Council
opened a high stakes bingo hall on its reservation in Ledyard. Relying upon its status as a federally
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contending that the Tribe was not excluded from the State regulation of
bingo operations, and the Tribe took the initiative to enjoin the state from
enforcing its bingo statutes on the Reservation.30 The federal court agreed
with the Tribe, marking the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe’s first win in a
series of cases asserting Tribal sovereignty over their on-Reservation
activities.31
In 1988, Congress passed the IGRA.32 The IGRA granted recognized
Indian Tribes the ability to operate high-stake “Class III” gaming
activities33 on the Reservation as long as the games were permitted by the
State for non-Indian entities.34 Relying on Connecticut’s “Las Vegas
Nights” statute,35 the Tribe attempted to enter into negotiations with the
recognized Indian tribe, the tribal council declined to seek approval for its bingo operation from the
State of Connecticut. Moreover, the tribal council, which enacted its own Bingo Control Ordinance,
showed no intention of conforming to Connecticut law regarding the conduct of bingo games within the
state.”).
30
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. McGuigan, 626 F. Supp. 245 (D. Conn. 1986) (Dorsey, J.).
31
The Tribe began its bingo operations in February 1985, and at that time the Tribe stated that it
did not “intend to conduct its bingo games either pursuant or subject to the requirements of Connecticut
law.” Id. at 246. The case hinged on deciding “whether the tribe’s conduct of bingo games remain[ed]
solely within its sovereignty or [was] subject to the regulation and control of the State of Connecticut
by reason of its bingo laws.” Id. The court agreed with the Tribe, deciding that “the dominant character
of the nature and purpose of Connecticut’s bingo laws is regulatory and the single penal statute
included therein . . . . [is] found not to be enforceable under a grant of jurisdiction over criminal law.”
Id. at 249. The Tribe’s motion for declaratory judgment was granted, and Connecticut was permanently
enjoined from enforcing any of its bingo laws on the Reservation. Id. at 249–50.
32
The IGRA was popularly known to have been the Congressional response to the Supreme Court
of the United States’ decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987),
which held that Indian Tribes could offer, on their Reservations, any gaming activity allowed by the
state. Id. at 211 (“In light of the fact that California permits a substantial amount of gambling activity,
including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its state lottery, we must conclude that
California regulates rather than prohibits gambling in general and bingo in particular.”). Congress,
eager to bolster the economic development and quasi-independence of the Indian Tribes, “codified the
Cabazon Band holding [as the IGRA], giving congressional consent to high-stakes bingo operations
conducted for tribal government purposes on tribal lands and under tribal regulations.” Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, California v. Cabazon Band: A Quarter-Century of Complex, Litigious Self-Determination, 59
FED. LAW., Apr. 2012, at 50, 51.
33
Under the IGRA, Class I gaming includes “social games solely for prizes of minimal value or
traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal
ceremonies or celebrations.” 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (2012). Class II gaming, the gaming that was central
to the Cabazon Band ruling, includes “bingo” and “card games that are explicitly authorized by the
laws of the State.” Id. § 2703(7) (2012). Class III gaming “means all forms of gaming that are not class
I gaming or class II gaming,” which would include slot machines. Id. § 2703(8) (2012).
34
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (2012) (“Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only
if such activities are . . . located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person,
organization, or entity, and conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the
Indian tribe and the State under paragraph (3) that is in effect.”).
35
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7-186a–186l (repealed effective Jan. 7, 2003). One of the considered
effects of the repeal of the Las Vegas Nights statue was the possible prevention of any future federally
recognized Tribes, such as the shortly recognized Eastern Pequot Tribe, from claiming a right to
operate a casino on their Reservation. See Letter from Richard Blumenthal, Conn. Attorney Gen., to
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State to allow Class III gaming on the Reservation. Connecticut refused to
negotiate, and the Tribe brought the State to court to compel negotiations
under the IGRA.36 The negotiations that followed failed to produce a
compact, and the State and Tribe submitted final proposals to a mediator
tasked with selecting the proposal that best adhered to the tenets of the
IGRA.37 The mediator chose the State’s proposal, but the State refused to
accept the compact.38 As a result, the Secretary of the Interior was
obligated under the IGRA to select a set of procedures that would permit
the Tribe to operate Class III gaming on their Reservation.39 A slightly
modified version of the State’s proposal was adopted by the Secretary of
the Interior.40 With these Gaming Procedures in place, the Tribe began
construction of what was at that time the largest casino in the world:
Foxwoods Resort Casino.41 The use of slot machines was never condoned
in the State’s Las Vegas Nights statute, which meant that the Tribe was
unable to offer the popular gaming activity in their new casino. Rather than
lobbying for the inclusion of slot machine gaming in the Las Vegas Nights
statute, a revenue sharing plan, in which the state would be paid one-fourth
of the “hold”42 from slot machine operations, was implemented in the
Memorandum of Understanding between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe
Conn. Senator Kevin B. Sullivan and Conn. Representative Moira K. Lyons (Dec. 20, 2002), available
at http://www.ct.gov/ag/lib/ag/indian/lasvegasnights.pdf (“Thus, repeal of the Las Vegas Nights statute
prior to the conclusion of the [Bureau of Indian Affairs’ Interior Board of Indian Appeals] review [of
the Eastern Pequot Tribe’s federal recognition determination] should not provide a legal basis for the
Eastern Pequots to claim a right to casino gaming based on a law no longer in effect. A federal district
court has ruled that even federally recognized tribes cannot claim a right to casino gaming if a state
repeals permitted gaming prior to the recognized tribes entering into a compact with the state.”).
36
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 737 F. Supp. 169 (D. Conn. 1990) (Dorsey, J.). The
section of the IGRA that allowed the Tribe to compel negotiations, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (2012), was
ultimately held unconstitutional as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 (1996) (“[W]e have found that Congress does not have authority under the
Constitution to make the State suable in federal court . . . .”).
37
Notice of Opportunity to Comment on Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg.
15,746 (Apr. 17, 1991).
38
Id. (“The State . . . declined to accept the mediator’s chosen compact, i.e., the State’s
proposal.”).
39
Id. It is important to note that the State and Tribe follow the Gaming Procedures instead of a
compact, though the Gaming Procedures serve an identical purpose.
40
Notice of Final Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,996 (May 31,
1991). The State proposal adopted by the Secretary to serve as the Gaming Procedures was altered only
to add an amendment for patron tort remedies and temporary licensing by the State. Proposal of the
State of Conn. For a Tribal-State Compact Between the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe and the State of
Conn. at 1–2, Mashantucket v. Connecticut, Civil Action No. H89-717 (D. Conn. Apr. 17, 1991)
[hereinafter the Gaming Procedures].
41
The casino opened February 15, 1992. Originally, there were planned closing and opening
times, but after the first day, several hundred patrons were still inside at closing time. The casino has
remained open since that day. Sokolove, supra note 26.
42
The “hold” is equal to the total amount paid into the slot machines decreased by the total
amount paid out as winnings. Id.
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and Connecticut.
Since then, the Tribe has received the lion’s share of its revenue
through its casino operations,44 though Foxwoods Resort Casino is far from
the Tribe’s only business enterprise. Outside of the Reservation, the Tribe
owns and operates several businesses, including the Lake of Isles private
golf club and the Spa at the Norwich Inn.45 The most impressive enterprise
owned by the Tribe remains its casino, which has grown significantly since
it was opened in 1992. In May 2008, the Tribe opened the most recent
expansion to its casino operations: the MGM Grand at Foxwoods Resort
Casino.46 This contemporary hotel and casino, though bearing the popular
MGM brand, is owned and operated by the Tribe. Recently, MGM and the
Tribe agreed to end the licensing agreement that allowed Foxwoods Resort
Casino to use the MGM brand.47 The MGM Grand at Foxwoods Resort
Casino was renamed The Fox Tower to better reflect its Tribal ownership,
while MGM remains hopeful that its brand can be put to a more profitable
use once their ongoing bid to open their own casino in neighboring
Massachusetts succeeds.48 The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe is considering a
similar expansion of its operations into Massachusetts, although a recent

43
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, CONN. AND THE MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBE (Jan.
13,
1993),
available
at
http://www.ct.gov/dcp/lib/dcp/pdf/gaming/memorandum_of_un
derstanding_foxwoods%5B1%5D.pdf (“The Tribe agrees that, so long as no change in State law is
enacted to permit the operation of video facsimiles or other commercial casino games by any other
person and no other person within the State lawfully operates video facsimiles or other commercial
casino games, the Tribe will contribute to the State a sum [the “Contribution”] equal to twenty-five per
cent (25%) of gross operating revenues of video facsimile games operated by the Tribe.”).
44
Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342, at *1 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) (“Gaming is
the Tribe’s principal source of revenue and provides the funds to support government services and the
general welfare of the Tribe and its members. The Tribe does have other revenue sources including a
sales tax, a hotel occupancy tax, and an admissions tax for on Reservation transactions.”).
45
Tribal Enterprises, THE MASHANTUCKET (WESTERN) PEQUOT TRIBAL NATION,
http://www.mashantucket.com/enterprises.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
46
Brian Hallenbeck, Foxwoods, MGM Announce End to Licensing Agreement, THE DAY (Oct.
25, 2013, 5:00 PM), http://www.theday.com/article/20131025/BIZ02/131029789/1017.
47
Id. (“‘With MGM working toward a significant presence on the East Coast, it was the
opportune time to review our relationship (with Foxwoods) and dissolve the licensing agreement,
[MGM spokesman Clark] Dumont said. At this point, he added, the relationship involved only the
licensing of the MGM Grand name and ‘no operating revenues.’”).
48
See Matthew Sturdevant, MGM Grand at Foxwoods Renamed The Fox Tower, HARTFORD
COURANT (Apr. 3, 2014), http://articles.courant.com/2014-04-03/business/hc-foxwoods-mgm-grand20140403_1_grand-pequot-tower-mashantucket-pequots-mgm-grand. While the Massachusetts
Gaming Commission awarded MGM a license to build a casino and entertainment resort in Springfield,
the ultimate outcome will be determined in November, when Massachusetts voters decide whether or
not to repeal the law allowing casinos to be built in the state. Jon Camp, Massachusetts Voters to
Decide on Casino Law in November, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (June 24, 2014, 3:21 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/massachusetts-court-allows-ballot-measure-on-casino-law-repeal1403621174.
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voter referendum may have halted that plan altogether.
The Foxwoods Resort Casino and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe were
not immune to the economic damage brought about by the Great
Recession.50 Foxwoods Resort Casino, which has about $2.3 billion in debt
at the time of this writing, is in negotiations with its creditors to reduce that
debt by about $600 million.51 While there are fewer people who feel
financially secure enough to gamble, there are signs of a modest increase
in casino patronage as the national economy recovers.52 Whether this
recovery will be maintained, especially considering future potential
competition in Massachusetts, only time will tell.
B. Leading to Pequot II
The Tribe advertises that it offers 5,500 slot machines in its casino.53 A
number of these slot machines are leased to the Tribe by several nonIndian, off-Reservation game companies. In 1997 and 1998, the Tribe
contracted with Atlantic City Coin & Slot Co. (AC Coin), a New Jersey
corporation, and WMS Gaming, Inc. (WMS), a Delaware corporation, to
lease slot machines to the Tribe for use in the casino.54 The contracts with
both AC Coin and WMS stipulated that any taxes applicable to the slot
machines would be assumed by the Tribe.55 In 2001, the Tribe met again
with AC Coin and WMS to renegotiate the terms of their contract.
Specifically, the contracts were amended to state that “(1) the Tribe is not
subject to state and local taxes; [and] (2) AC Coin or WMS will not file
any declaration or pay any taxes with respect to gaming machines leased to
the Tribe . . . .”56 The Tribe believed that non-Indian property leased to
them for gaming on the Reservation could not be taxed by the state.
Despite the changes made to the contracts, AC Coin and WMS “continued

49
See Matthew Sturdevant, Massachusetts Voters Reject Foxwoods’ $1 Billion Casino Plan,
HARTFORD COURANT (Nov. 19, 2013), http://articles.courant.com/2013-11-19/business/hc-milfordfoxwoods-vote-1120-20131119_1_casino-license-casino-measure-casino-free-milford (reporting that
voters rejected the plan).
50
“The Pequots misjudged the market, borrowed too much and expanded unwisely. Foxwoods’s
debt is on a scale befitting the size of the property—$2.3 billion.” Sokolove, supra note 26.
51
Id.
52
Id. (“Revenues have continued to fall at Foxwoods, as they have for the last half-dozen years.
But lately, the casino’s profits have been increasing. ‘We changed our focus to profitability,’
[Foxwoods Chief Exectuive Scott] Butera said . . . . [W]hat he meant was that Foxwoods had stopped
chasing unproductive customers—table-game players whose perks added up to more than their
losses—just to increase traffic.”).
53
Slots, FOXWOODS, http://www.foxwoods.com/slots.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2014).
54
Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012).
55
Id.
56
Id. at *2.
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to pay personal property taxes until the Tribe pressured them to stop.”
In 2003, the accounting firm responsible for managing AC Coin’s
taxes accidentally filed a property tax declaration with the Town of
Ledyard.58 This declaration included a list of all the slot machines leased to
the Tribe.59 Since receiving this declaration the town has levied a tax on
the slot machines leased by AC Coin to the Tribe.60 Amazingly, the
accounting firm retained by WMS made a similar blunder in 2004, when
the firm accidentally filed a property tax declaration which included all of
the slot machines leased by WMS to the Tribe.61 AC Coin, against the
wishes of the Tribe, complied with all tax assessments from that point on.62
WMS, on the other hand, paid the property tax assessed on the leased slot
machines in 2006 under protest, and, at the behest of the Tribe, has not
paid them since.63
In 2006, AC Coin filed an appeal with Ledyard’s Board of Assessment
Appeals, arguing that the slot machines’ exclusive use on the Reservation
for Indian gaming called for the preemption of the state tax. The Board was
unconvinced,64 and AC Coin, along with the Tribe, filed a complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut to request that
Ledyard be enjoined from taxing the slot machines leased to the Tribe.
Connecticut intervened as a defendant and filed a motion to dismiss,65
marking the start of the Pequot Trilogy.66
57
Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 2013). The short time between the Tribe’s insistence that
the tax no longer be paid and the accidental filing by the vendors’ accounting firms suggests that 2002
was the only successful year for the contract’s tax provision.
58
Pequot II, 2012 WL 1069342, at *2.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id. at *3.
62
Id. at *2.
63
Days before the Pequot III decision was published, “the Tribe notified the Court that AC Coin
would cease operations on June 30, 2013.” Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 461 n.3 (2d Cir. 2013). WMS
still leases slot machines to the Tribe at the time of this writing.
64
Id. at 462.
65
The State claimed that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
controversy, though the Court disagreed. Pequot I, 2007 WL 1238338, at *2 (“Taking the allegations
[that the tax causes the Tribe economic harm and impedes self-government] as true, as this Court must
on a motion to dismiss, the Tribe advances a claim to enforce its own rights and interests. . . . [In
addition,] prior district courts have rejected comity as the basis of dismissal in the context of Indian
tribes challenging state regulation.”). The Court similarly rejected the State’s assertion that the Tribe
failed to state a relievable claim. Id. at *3 (“Upon review of the complaint, this Court agrees that the
Tribe has alleged a cognizable claim that the doctrines of federal preemption and tribal sovereignty
preclude the taxation at issue.”).
66
The Indian Trader Statutes, IRGA, and Bracker’s preemptive test may be the crux of Pequot II
and Pequot III, but several incidental arguments were made by the State concerning jurisdiction: (1) the
Tribe lacked standing to sue, (2) the action was outside the federal court’s jurisdiction under the Tax
Injunction Act, and (3) the doctrine of comity compelled the court to dismiss the case. Pequot III, 722
F.3d at 462–66. The courts in Pequot II and Pequot III agreed with the Tribe on all of the jurisdictional
arguments. Id. at 463 (“We find that (1) the district court properly reached the merits of the case . . . .”).
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III. Preemption Under Bracker, the Indian Trader Statutes, and the IGRA
A. The Bracker Preemption Analysis
Decided in 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States opinion in
Bracker provides a preemption test to determine the validity of state action
when “a State asserts authority over the conduct of non-Indians engaging
in activity on the reservation.”67 The White Mountain Apache Tribe
operated a logging business on their Arizona Reservation. As a part of that
business they hired several non-Indian contractors to perform certain
logging activities.68 One contractor, Pinetop, was hired to fell trees on the
Reservation and then transport the timber to the Tribe’s sawmill, which
was also located on the Reservation.69 The state sought to levy its generally
applied motor carrier tax70 and excise fuel tax71 on Pinetop. Pinetop sued
the State and the Tribe, which had previously agreed to bear the economic
incidence72 of any “tax liability incurred [by Pinetop] as a result of its onreservation business activities,” intervened as a plaintiff after paying the
taxes.73
The Court made it clear that in cases concerning “on-reservation
conduct involving only Indians . . . state law is generally inapplicable, for
The Tribe had standing because Indian Tribes are permitted to sue in cases where their sovereignty is
unconstitutionally infringed by the state. “The injury in this case is neither speculative nor generalized;
there is a real tax with measurable interference in the Tribe’s sovereignty on its reservation. The Tribe
has standing to vindicate these interests.” Id. at 464 (citation omitted). The Tax Injunction Act limits
certain state tax cases to the state court system by providing that “district courts shall not enjoin,
suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy
and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). “Since we are
required to decide whether the state tax at issue conflicts with the federal measures enacted for the
Tribe’s protection, we have undoubted jurisdiction—notwithstanding the TIA—to perform that task.
Recognizing this requirement, Congress bestowed on the federal courts original jurisdiction over ‘all’
federal claims brought by tribes.” Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 465. Finally, the case could not be dismissed
due to comity because “there are strong federal interests in determining the contours of the Indian
Trader Statutes and IGRA, two federal regulatory regimes that entirely occupy (and preclude state
legislation in) fields of indeterminate size” and because “federal courts have regularly entertained
Indian tribes’ challenges to state taxes.” Id. at 466.
67
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980).
68
Id. at 138–39.
69
Id. at 139.
70
This was a 2.5% tax on gross receipts applied to any “‘contract motor carrier of property’ . . .
engaged in ‘the transportation by motor vehicle of property, for compensation, on any public
highway.’” Id.
71
This excise tax consisted of a charge of “eight cents per gallon of fuel used ‘in the propulsion of
a motor vehicle on any highway within this state.’” Id. at 140 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40601(A)(1) (1974)).
72
Id. at 151. The majority made it clear that the economic incidence on the Tribe is not what led
to preemption, but rather “the pre-emptive effect of the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme.” Id.
at 151 n.15. The majority’s discussion of economic incidence in the opinion was unexpected, and
“would be used against the Indians in subsequent cases.” Pomp, supra note 6, at 1129.
73
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 140.
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the State’s regulatory interest is likely to be minimal and the federal
interest in encouraging tribal self-government is at its strongest.”74 The
Court could not apply that general rule in this case, which they
characterized as “a State assert[ing] authority over the conduct of nonIndians engaging in activity on the reservation.”75 To resolve this, the
Court chose to wield “a particularized inquiry into the nature of the state,
federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine
whether, in the specific context, the exercise of state authority would
violate federal law.”76
This inquiry, as applied to the facts of the case, yielded a stronger
interest for the federal government and the Tribe. The Secretary of the
Interior had “broad authority over the sale of timber on the reservation,”77
and pursuant to that authority developed a series of regulations “to govern
the harvesting and sale of tribal timber”78 and “govern[] the roads
developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.”79 The Court held that “the
federal regulatory scheme [was] so pervasive as to preclude the additional
burdens sought to be imposed in this case,”80 and that the interest inherent
in the federal regulations were enhanced by the “general federal policy of
encouraging tribes ‘to revitalize their self-government’ and to assume
control over their ‘business and economic affairs.’”81 This overwhelming
federal interest easily outweighed the state’s interest in a “general desire to
raise revenue,”82 and as such the Tribal interest went unaddressed. The
“particularized” element of the preemption test was underscored in the
Court’s conclusion.
74

Id. at 144.
Id.
76
Id. at 145. The Bracker analysis is best characterized as an interest balancing test, rather than a
traditional preemption analysis. See Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 101–02
(2005) (describing Bracker as putting forth an “interest-balancing test”); Pomp, supra note 6, at 1131
(“A classical preemption analysis would determine what Congress intended when it adopted a
statute.”).
77
Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145.
78
Id. at 146–47.
79
Id. at 147. The roads regulated by the BIA included the roads being used in this case. Id. at
147–48.
80
Id. at 148.
81
Id. at 149.
82
Id. at 150.
75

Arizona made a feeble attempt at asserting its interests by referring to a “general
desire to raise revenue,” which hardly merited any consideration. The roads used by
the logging company were “built, maintained, and policed exclusively by the
Federal Government, the Tribe, and its contractors.” Consequently, Arizona could
not claim a quid pro quo to justify its tax. The reality was that Arizona had nothing
to do with the logging operations, just the way it had no responsibility for the
reservation in Warren Trading.
Pomp, supra note 6, at 1129 (citations omitted) (quoting Bracker, 448 U.S. at 150).
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Where, as here, the Federal Government has undertaken
comprehensive regulation of the harvesting and sale of tribal
timber, where a number of the policies underlying the federal
regulatory scheme are threatened by the taxes respondents
seek to impose, and where respondents are unable to justify
the taxes except in terms of a generalized interest in raising
revenue, we believe that the proposed exercise of state
authority is impermissible.83
Bracker’s preemption rule was applied and reaffirmed in Ramah Navajo
School Board v. Bureau of Revenue,84 a decision that was authored by
Justice Thurgood Marshall, the Justice who wrote the majority opinion in
Bracker and introduced the Bracker balancing test into the common law.85
Ramah, which had facts very similar to Bracker, was brought by a Tribe
that employed a non-Indian contractor to build a school on their
Reservation.86 The state imposed its sales tax on the materials purchased
by the contractor for the school’s construction, and the Tribe, who
reimbursed the contractor for these purchases, argued that the sales tax was
preempted under Bracker.87
The Court agreed with the Tribe, holding that the federal government’s
“regulatory scheme precludes any state tax that ‘stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”88
Both the services provided by the state and the ultimate bearer of the sales
tax were important factors in the Court’s analysis.
The only arguably specific interest advanced by the State is
that it provides services to [the non-Indian contractor] for its
activities off the reservation. This interest, however, is not a
legitimate justification for a tax whose ultimate burden falls
on the tribal organization. Furthermore, although the State
may confer substantial benefits on [the non-Indian
contractor] as a state contractor, we fail to see how these
benefits can justify a tax imposed on the construction of
school facilities on tribal lands pursuant to a contract
between the tribal organization and the non-Indian
83

Bracker, 448 U.S. at 151.
458 U.S. 832 (1982).
85
See Pomp, supra note 6, at 1126 (“Justice Marshall endorsed a ‘particularized inquiry into the
nature of the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry designed to determine whether, in the
specific context, the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.’ This language was
ambiguous enough to be confused with a balancing test, which is the way some subsequent cases have
interpreted it, although nowhere does [Bracker] use that phrase.”) (citations omitted) (quoting Bracker,
448 U.S. at 145).
86
Ramah, 458 U.S. at 835.
87
Id. at 837.
88
Id. at 845.
84
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contracting firm.

The Bracker decision represents the modern interpretation of the federal
preemption of state taxes imposed on non-Indians doing business with the
Tribes.90 Under Bracker, a state tax may be imposed on a non-Indian
engaging in an activity with a Tribe so long as the state has an interest
strong enough to defeat the Tribal and federal interests at stake.91 The
federal interests are frequently divined by evaluating “the degree of federal
regulation involved” in the case.92 Collective laws like the IGRA and the
Indian Trader Statutes are used as evidence of a strong federal interest in
regulating Indian gaming and trade with Indians respectively, though the
facts of the case must be in line with the type of regulation those federal
statutes are written for.93
Federal interests receive the most attention in the two decisions,
perhaps because the Courts in Pequot II and Pequot III, despite the
opposing weight given to the identified interests, generally agree on the
state, municipal, and Tribal interests at stake in the case. The state, as it so
often does, has an interest in ensuring the uniform application of its
generally applied property tax,94 the town has an interest in collecting the
89

Id. at 843–44.

90

[Bracker’s] preemption analysis has come to overshadow the Williams v. Lee
infringement test, the second of Marshall’s two barriers to “the assertion of state
regulatory authority over tribal reservations and its members.” . . . [P]reemption has
come to encompass a balancing test, weighing the federal and tribal interests against
the state’s interests, with a backdrop of tribal sovereignty that presumably places a
thumb on the scales in favor of the Indians. The preemption test appears to take into
account the same values as the infringement test, leading Professor Jensen to
conclude that in the tax context “preemption has effectively swallowed
infringement.”
Pomp, supra note 6, at 1131 (citations omitted) (quoting Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and Doing Business
in Indian Country, 60 ME. L. REV. 1, 62 (2008)).
91
Ramah, 458 U.S. at 838 (“The State’s interest in exercising its regulatory authority over the
activity in question must be examined and given appropriate weight. Pre-emption analysis in this area
is not controlled by “mechanical or absolute conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty”; it requires a
particularized examination of the relevant state, federal, and tribal interests.”) (quoting White Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980)).
92
Barona Band of Mission Indians v. Yee, 528 F.3d 1184, 1190 (9th Cir. 2008).
93
See infra Part III.B and Part III.C for a discussion of cases evaluating federal interest in the
Indian Trader Statutes and the IGRA.
94
Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 474–76 (2d Cir. 2013) (“The Town and State have more at stake than
the Tribe. The economic effect of the tax on the Tribe is negligible; its economic value to the Town is
not. The Tribe’s sovereign interest in being able to exercise sole taxing authority over possession of
property is insufficient to outweigh the State’s interest in the uniform application of its generallyapplicable tax, particularly where, as here, there is room for both State and Tribal taxation of the same
activity.”); Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342, at *12 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) (“In this
instance, the State and Town interests in the tax do not vindicate its imposition. The State’s regulation
of the gaming is funded by the amount the Tribe provides to the State pursuant to the Gaming
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revenue needed to provide services to the Tribe, and the Tribe has an
interest in economic development and protecting its sovereignty.96 Of
course, Pequot II and Pequot III weigh these factors in drastically different
ways.
In particular, the interest in protecting Tribal sovereignty has been
progressively weakened since it was first used to completely insulate the
Tribes from a state’s exercise of authority in Worcester v. Georgia.97 The
Procedures. The State and Town’s interest in compliance with the property tax on the vendors is
diminished by the existence of legal precedent that had previously rendered the tax questionable and
this decision finding the tax to be improper.”).
95
Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 474–76 (“In this case, the Town has a cognizable economic interest in
imposing the tax. The Supreme Court has recognized ‘the dependency of state budgets on the receipt of
local tax revenues’ and ‘appreciate[s] the difficulties encountered by [local governments] should a
substantial portion of [their] rightful tax revenue be tied up in’ litigation. The Town’s economic interest
therefore exceeds the value of the taxes on slot machines, insofar as a ruling favorable to the Tribe
could invite other non-Indian owners of personal property on the reservation to initiate similar
actions.”) (citation omitted); Pequot II, 2012 WL 1069342, at *12 (“The Town’s interest in funding the
education and bussing of the Tribe’s children is weak because such services have no nexus to the taxed
activity of gaming or even leasing gaming equipment. The maintenance of the roads to the Reservation
has some connection to the taxed activity because the leased gaming equipment was brought onto the
Reservation by way of the roads and the individuals who use the gaming equipment also use the roads
to the Reservation.”).
96
Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 473–74 (“The tax implicates two Tribal interests—economic
development and sovereignty over the reservation—but the parties dispute the magnitude of the tax’s
impact on each. The economic effect of the tax on the Tribe is minimal. . . . [But t]he tax has a
moderate effect on tribal sovereignty. . . . The State’s personal property tax, as imposed on the slot
machines located entirely on-reservation, overlaps with the Tribe’s ability to set the restrictions to
property rights in its sovereign territory. . . . [T]his encroachment into an area of tribal sovereignty,
however modest, is a recognized injury that must be considered in a Bracker balancing.”); Pequot II,
2012 WL 1069342, at *11 (“[T]he Tribe has a strong interest in its ability to self-govern as facilitated
by the economic revenue generated by the gaming activities. . . . [T]he Tribe bears the direct burden of
ultimately bearing the cost of the taxes, which infringes upon the revenue generated by the Tribe’s
gaming, the Tribe’s chief source of income. Accordingly, the Tribe’s substantial interest weighs against
the imposition of the tax.”).
97
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 520 (1832) (“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community,
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress. The whole
intercourse between the United States and this nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in the
government of the United States.”). Worcester, and by extension a great deal of any preemptive power
held in the Indian sovereignty doctrine, was reduced to a “backdrop” in McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Commission, 411 U.S. 164, 171–72 (1973) (“[We do not] say that the Indian sovereignty doctrine,
with its concomitant jurisdictional limit on the reach of state law, has remained static during the 141
years since Worcester was decided. Not surprisingly, the doctrine has undergone considerable
evolution in response to changed circumstances. . . . The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant, then,
not because it provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit, but because it provides a
backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be read. It must always be
remembered that the various Indian tribes were once independent and sovereign nations, and that their
claim to sovereignty long predates that of our own Government.”) (emphasis added). At the very least,
it is conceded that the Indian sovereignty doctrine can bolster federal, as well as Tribal, interests in a
Bracker test.

2014]

MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT TRIBE V. TOWN OF LEDYARD

215

argument that sovereignty is directly affected by the imposition of a tax is
a common one, though its effectiveness varies, even when applied to
contractors working for the federal government. The Supreme Court of the
United States held in Alabama v. King & Boozer98 that a federal contractor
could not cloak their purchases in tax immunity merely by doing business
with the federal government, even when the cost of the tax was passed on
to the federal government.99 It is tempting to apply the same rational to
Pequot III, but the rule is clear that
Tribal reservations are not States, and the differences in the
form and nature of their sovereignty make it treacherous to
import to one notions of pre-emption that are properly
applied to the other. The tradition of Indian sovereignty over
the reservation and tribal members must inform the
determination whether the exercise of state authority has
been pre-empted by operation of federal law . . . .100
Tribal sovereignty is fundamentally different from state or federal
sovereignty. Whether Tribal sovereignty is offended enough to weigh in
favor of Bracker preemption depends on the facts unique to the case. It is
possible, and I would suggest more probable than not, that Pequot III
would have had a different outcome if the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe was
much less financially impressive, or if the property tax had a greater total
impact on the Tribe’s bottom line.
States generally have an interest in the uniform application of its laws
and taxes. Pequot III holds this interest in high regard, considering it to be
stronger than the federal and Tribal interest in ensuring the Tribe’s
economic development, and additionally opines that “[t]he Town’s
economic interest . . . exceeds the value of the taxes on slot machines,
insofar as a ruling favorable to the Tribe could invite other non-Indian
owners of personal property on the reservation to initiate similar
actions.”101 The Second Circuit imagined that a ruling in favor of the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribe would make the Reservation an easily
accessible tax haven, a concern that has long been the bane of many Tribal
98

314 U.S. 1 (1941).
Id. at 12 (“[T]he legal effect of the transaction which we have detailed was to obligate the
contractors to pay for the lumber. The lumber was sold and delivered on the order of the contractors,
which stipulated that the Government should not be bound to pay for it. It was in fact paid for by the
contractors, who were reimbursed by the Government pursuant to their contract with it. The contractors
were thus purchasers of the lumber, within the meaning of the taxing statute, and as such were subject
to the [sales] tax. They were not relieved of the liability to pay the tax either because the contractors, in
a loose and general sense, were acting for the Government in purchasing the lumber or, as the Alabama
Supreme Court seems to have thought, because the economic burden of the tax imposed upon the
purchaser would be shifted to the Government by reason of its contract to reimburse the contractors.”).
100
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980) (citation omitted).
101
Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 475.
99
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challenges to state taxation. Tribal interest was defeated because the
Court did not want to make it easy for non-Indians to avoid state taxation
by engaging in certain types of business with the Tribe. An outcome
favorable to the Tribe would be unfavorable to the town, and because of
that, the town’s interest outweighs the Tribe’s. Why not vice versa?
Pequot III’s evaluation of the town and state interest is particularly
precarious when compared to the more cogent assessment presented by
Pequot II. Pequot II chose to give less weight to the state interests at stake,
saying that the state’s interest in uniform application was diminished by
the simple existence of a precedent of allowing non-Indian activity within
Indian country to be preempted from state taxation.103 This seems like a
much better view of the underlying purpose of the Bracker test than what
we see in Pequot III. After all, sometimes the just outcome will rightly
result in inconsistent state taxation. Pequot II additionally determined that
the state’s interest in financing the regulation of the Tribe’s gaming
operations through the tax was weakened because that regulation was
funded by amounts paid by the Tribe as dictated by the Gaming
Procedures.104 This may be a little off base if taken out of context. Taxation
would be quite cumbersome if every tax had to have a corresponding state
action justifying that tax, but it is necessary for the tax to have a nexus with
the taxed activity. Pequot II found that the town’s interest in bussing and
educating Tribal children had no nexus with the taxation of leased slot
machines on the Reservation.105 This is a significant point, as it is
ultimately non-Indian vendors, and not the Tribe, who bear the burden of
this tax. A nexus would have to be found in the services provided by the
state to the non-Indian vendor. Of course, the delivery and removal of the
leased slot machines would not be possible without roads, but even Pequot
III only meagerly endorses the connection between road maintenance, slot

102
See, e.g., Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134,
155 (1980) (“It is painfully apparent that the value marketed by the smokeshops to persons coming
from outside is not generated on the reservations by activities in which the Tribes have a significant
interest. What the smokeshops offer these customers, and what is not available elsewhere, is solely an
exemption from state taxation. The Tribes assert the power to create such exemptions by imposing their
own taxes or otherwise earning revenues by participating in the reservation enterprises. If this assertion
were accepted, the Tribes could impose a nominal tax and open chains of discount stores at reservation
borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep discounts and drawing custom from surrounding areas.
We do not believe that principles of federal Indian law, whether stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal
self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from state taxation
to persons who would normally do their business elsewhere.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The
apparently bleak future described by the Pequot III opinion presumes that the activities and property
related to gaming are not implicitly brought under federal control by the IGRA, which is discussed in
greater detail in Part III.C.
103
Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342, at *12 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012).
104
Id.
105
Id.
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machine taxation, and the Tribe. Nexus may exist with services provided
to the non-Indian vendor, but is that enough to weigh significantly in favor
of the state over the Tribe? It was not in Ramah, and as such the answer
must be an emphatic “no,” especially against the backdrop of Tribal
sovereignty.
Bracker cannot provide a perfect or consistent answer, as balancing
tests in general are frequently criticized for being “rudderless, affording
insufficient guidance to decisionmakers.”107 The courts disagree on the
strength of each interest, which is invariably the outcome when two
different people are asked to assign a “weight” to something as incorporeal
as an interest. The value of a uniform tax system may mean the difference
between order and anarchy to one judge, while a second may believe that a
state overreaches when taxing an operation controlled by the federal
government. The question of whether a preemption test is the best way to
arrive at a just decision based on the unique facts of each case is outside
the scope of this Comment. The Tribal and federal interests, weighed
against the fairly feeble state interest in this case, is enough to resolve the
Bracker test in favor of the Tribe. The state’s primary interest in
uniformity is inadequate; the state’s nexus with the taxed property is
untenable at best, and the federal government has at least two pieces of
legislation suggesting that they prefer to engage in this relationship with
the Tribe exclusively.
Aside from the Bracker balancing test, finding that either the Indian
Trader Statues or the IGRA denotes the exclusive federal regulation of a
slot machine lease agreement between a non-Indian vendor and the Tribe
would conclude the test in any U.S. jurisdiction, with preemption being the
only comprehensible outcome.
B. The Indian Trader Statutes
The Indian Trader Statutes, created by Congress in 1834 to prevent
Indians from being defrauded in their trading activities,108 do not explicitly
take away the states’ power to tax Indian Tribes. They rather, as decided in
Warren Trading Post, “show that Congress has taken the business of
Indian trading on reservations so fully in hand that no room remains for
106
Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 475 (“The Town’s economic interest in the generally applicable tax is
therefore connected, in some respect, to the generally available services that it provides.”) (emphasis
added).
107
Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95, 124 (2005) (Ginsberg, J. dissenting)
(referencing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 176
(1980) (Rehnquist, J. concurring)).
108
Cent. Mach. Co. v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160, 165 (1980) (“One of the
fundamental purposes of these statutes . . . [is] to protect Indians from becoming victims of fraud in
dealings with persons selling goods . . . .”).
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state laws imposing additional burdens upon traders.” The Court held
that the sales tax levied on “sales made to reservation Indians on the
reservation”110 by the federally licensed Indian trader was, as the existence
of the Indian Trader Statues proved, outside of the authority that states
have over the Indian Tribes.111
Central Machinery Company v. Arizona Tax Commission112 reiterated
and modestly extended the Indian Trader Statutes restrictions, but more
importantly established that a state tax on sales made to reservation Indians
could be preempted simply because the Indian Trader Statutes existed,
regardless of the vendor’s licensing status as an Indian trader.113 Central
Machinery, an off-Reservation farm tractor retailer, sold several tractors to
the federally recognized Gila River Indian Tribe.114 The complaints and
facts of the case were nearly identical to Warren Trading Post with two
key distinctions: Central Machinery was not a federally licensed Indian
trader and Central Machinery did not have “a permanent place of business
on the reservation.”115 Despite the fact that the Indian Trader Statutes
explicitly forbade unlicensed trading with Indians,116 the Court held that it
was the simple “existence of the Indian trader statutes, then, and not their
administration, that pre-empts the field of transactions with Indians
occurring on reservations.”117 As the Court chose to ignore the type of
unlicensed trading specifically prohibited by the Indian Trader Statutes and
instead focused on their preemptive meaning, the text of the Indian Trader
Statutes is in effect irrelevant.118 Central Machinery and Warren Trading
109

Warren Trading Post v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 380 U.S. 685, 690 (1965).
Id. at 691–92. The distinction between Indians and non-Indians, as well as whether the activity
occurred on or off-reservation, is extremely important. Sales to non-Indians on a reservation and sales
to Indians off reservation are both taxable. Buying from a federally licensed Indian trader became
almost entirely meaningless in the Court’s interpretation of the Indian Trader Statutes.
111
The tax was held to violate the Indian Trader Statutes, not to preempt them. “Justice Black’s
opinion reads like a straightforward preemption analysis. The comprehensive, all-inclusive, detailed
regulations occupied the field and preempted the State tax. Congress had ‘undertaken to regulate
reservation trading in such a comprehensive way that there is no room for the States to legislate on the
subject.’” Pomp, supra note 6, at 1010–11 (quoting Warren Trading Post Co., 380 U.S. at 692 n.18).
The true preemptive use of the Indian Trader Statutes would come fifteen years later in Central
Machinery Company.
112
448 U.S. 160 (1980).
113
Id. at 165 (“It is the existence of the Indian trader statutes, then, and not their administration,
that pre-empts the field of transactions with Indians occurring on reservations.”).
114
Id. at 161.
115
Id. at 164.
116
“Any person other than an Indian of the full blood who shall attempt to reside in the Indian
country . . . or to introduce goods, or to trade therein, without such license, shall forfeit all merchandise
offered for sale to the Indians or found in his possession, and shall moreover be liable to a penalty of
$500 . . . .” 25 U.S.C. § 264 (2012).
117
Cent. Mach. Co., 448 U.S. at 165.
118
The Court suggests that if the matter had been pressed, Central Machinery could be considered
a de facto federally licensed Indian trader. “Although appellant was not licensed to engage in trading
110
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Post began the line of cases adjudicating federal preemption under the
Indian Trader Statutes. When used as evidence of a strong federal interest
in a Bracker test, the Indian Trader Statutes preempt any state sales tax
levied on a sale made on a reservation to a reservation Indian.119
The Supreme Court of the United States has refused to go any further
than Central Machinery’s preemptive interpretation of the Indian Trader
Statutes. They have declined to extend the preemptive power of the Indian
Trader Statutes to taxes imposed on non-Indians making purchases on a
reservation120 and have held that the Indian Trader Statutes do not prevent
a state from implementing “quotas” on tax-exempt reservation sales.121 As
interpreted today, preemption under the Indian Trader Statutes almost
certainly occurs when the activity constitutes a sale on a reservation to a
reservation Indian, though it is important to note that preemption under the
Indian Trader Statutes has been limited solely to the imposition of state
sales taxes.122 There is a strong federal interest implicit in the Indian Trader
Statutes, and as such, the federal and Tribal interests will almost always
outweigh the state interest in imposing a sales tax meeting the criteria
above.
The Court in Pequot II wanted to interpret the Indian Trader Statutes
as something that the Supreme Court of the United States may have
intended at one time in Warren Trading Post, but has since stepped away
from in subsequent rulings. Certainly, the existence of the Indian Trader
Statutes is strong evidence of the federal government’s interest in
with Indians, the Bureau of Indian Affairs had approved both the contract of sale for the tractors in
question and the tribal budget, which allocated money for the purchase of this machinery.” Id. at 165
n.4. “Apparently the Bureau either thought no license was required or was indifferent about whether
one was. The Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae states without any citation that ‘in practice
no “license” is issued for a single transaction.’” Pomp, supra note 6, at 1019 n.477 (citation omitted).
119
State laws are preempted by federal laws when the state law “interferes or is incompatible with
federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to
justify the assertion of state authority.” New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334
(1983). “In balancing these federal, tribal, and state interests, no specific congressional intent to
preempt state activity is required.” Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson, 37 F.3d 430, 433 (9th
Cir. 1994).
120
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 155–56 (1980)
(“The Indian trader statutes incorporate a congressional desire comprehensively to regulate businesses
selling goods to reservation Indians for cash or exchange, but no similar intent is evident with respect
to sales by Indians to nonmembers of the Tribe.”) (citations omitted).
121
Dep’t of Taxation & Fin. v. Milhelm Attea & Bros., 512 U.S. 61, 75 (1994) (“By imposing a
quota on tax-free cigarettes, New York has not sought to dictate ‘the kind and quantity of goods and the
prices at which such goods shall be sold to the Indians. Indian traders remain free to sell Indian tribes
and retailers as many cigarettes as they wish, of any kind and at whatever price.”) (citation omitted).
122
In Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28, 32–33 (1885), property taxes levied on nonIndian property within a reservation were held to be valid. The decision has never been overruled, but
since the opinion is very old, Pequot II does not discuss it and Pequot III dismisses it as being out of
touch with contemporary law, which now requires a preemption analysis to support a property tax.
Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 472 (2d Cir. 2013).
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regulating trade with the Indian Tribes, but Pequot II’s analysis ends with
Warren Trading Post without further deliberating on whether the
imposition of a property tax on a leased slot machine is the type of state
regulation that the Indian Trader Statutes preempt. Pequot II was right to
characterize the lease as a sale to the Tribe,123 but it cannot be said that the
Connecticut property tax was levied on that transaction. Indian trading is
the focus of preemption under the Indian Trader Statutes, and they have
never been held to preempt the imposition of a property tax on property
that is temporarily leased to the Tribe.
Pequot III followed precedent, and correctly kept the preemptive
power of the Indian Trader Statutes limited to sales taxes. The Indian
Trader Statutes would not preempt Connecticut’s property tax, because the
Indian Trader Statutes have the whole of their preemptive power directed
toward transactions with the Indians. The analysis could stop there, but
Pequot III continues, weighing the relevant state, Tribal, and federal
interests in a preamble to their Bracker discussion.
The ultimate reason the Indian Trader Statutes fail to preempt the tax is
because it is not a sales tax. However, it is important to recognize that a
property tax on leased property presumably increases the cost passed on by
the lessor to the lessee. Should the Indian Trader Statutes preempt a tax
that would directly affect the trade price when the lessee is a Tribe? Not
according to precedent. Had the tax been a sales or use tax, there would be
no question that the strong federal interest in regulating Indian trade,
manifested in the Indian Trader Statutes, would defeat any state interest, no
matter how compelling. However, the tax was levied on the ownership of
property, and as such, Pequot III correctly applied the common law rule
when it held that “the Indian Trader Statutes do not preempt the personal
property tax ‘expressly or by plain implication.’”124 Ruling otherwise
would be, rightly or wrongly, a significant expansion of the preemptive
power of the Indian Trader Statutes.
C. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
The IGRA, drafted in 1988 by the Select Committee on Indian Affairs,
was designed with three stated goals:
(1) to provide a . . . means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments;
(2) to . . . shield it from organized crime and other corrupting
123
25 C.F.R. § 140.5(a)(6) (2014) (“Trading means buying, selling, bartering, renting, leasing,
permitting and any other transaction involving the acquisition of property or services.”) (emphasis
added).
124
Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 469 (quoting Cotton Petroleum Co. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163,
175–76 (1989)).
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influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary
beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that
gaming is conducted fairly and honestly by both the operator
and players; and (3) to declare that the establishment of
independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming on
Indian lands, the establishment of Federal standards for
gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a National
Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet
congressional concerns regarding gaming and to protect such
gaming as a means of generating tribal revenue.125
The IGRA allows a Tribe to conduct Class III gaming operations on its
reservation if the state “permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity”126 and is “conducted in conformance with a
Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.”127
While the Tribal-State compact does give the state the ability to negotiate
the imposition of some authority over the gaming operations on a
reservation, the IGRA explicitly provides that it cannot be read as
“conferring upon a State or any of its political subdivisions authority to
impose any tax, fee, charge, or other assessment upon an Indian tribe or
upon any other person or entity authorized by an Indian tribe to engage in a
class III activity.”128
The IGRA does not explicitly preempt any state laws, nor does it
prevent a state from imposing a tax on gaming operations if the Tribe
agrees to it in the Tribal-State compact.129 However, the federal interest in
regulating Indian gaming is so strong, as is evident by the existence and
purpose of the IGRA, that the Eighth Circuit decided in Gaming
Corporation of America v. Dorsey & Whitney130 that “Congress . . . left
states with no regulatory role over gaming except as expressly authorized
125
25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012). More to the point on the IGRA’s federal regulatory authority over
Indian gaming operations, the legislative history of the law suggests that the IGRA was written to
provide

a framework for the regulation of gaming activities on Indian lands which provides
that in the exercise of its sovereign rights, unless a tribe affirmatively elects to have
State laws and State jurisdiction extend to tribal lands, the Congress will not
unilaterally impose or allow State jurisdiction on Indian lands for the regulation of
Indian gaming activities.
S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 5–6 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3075.
126
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(B) (2012).
127
Id. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2012).
128
Id. § 2710(d)(4) (2012).
129
Id. § 2710(d)(3)(C)(iv) (2012) (“Any Tribal-State compact negotiated under subparagraph (A)
may include provisions relating to . . . taxation by the Indian tribe of such activity in amounts
comparable to amounts assessed by the State for comparable activities . . . .”).
130
88 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1996).
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by IGRA, and under it, the only method by which a state can apply its
general civil laws to gaming is through a tribal-state compact.”131 In a
Ninth Circuit case, Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Wilson,132 a state
fee imposed on all off track gaming operations was held to be preempted
by the IGRA when applied to the Indian tribes hosting off track betting on
their Reservation.133 The IGRA made the federal interest so plain that
preemption was essentially the only option, especially in Wilson where the
state was actually making more money from collecting the fee from the
Tribe than the Tribe made through its gaming operations.134 The analysis in
Wilson yielded a stronger interest for the federal government because the
tax was directly imposed on an Indian gaming activity.135
Most relevant to Pequot II and Pequot III, though not binding in either
case, was the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Barona Band of Mission Indians
v. Yee.136 In Yee, the Tribe challenged the imposition of a state sales tax on
the materials purchased by the Tribe’s non-Indian contractor for an
expansion of the Tribe’s casino.137 The Court disagreed with the Tribe,
131
Id. at 546. The Eight Circuit suggested that the drafters of the IGRA “intended to expressly
preempt the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands. Consequently, Federal courts
should not balance competing Federal, State, and tribal interests to determine the extent to which
various gaming activities are allowed.” Id. at 544 (emphasis added).
132
37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1994).
133
Id. at 435.
134
Id. at 433 (“The federal interests before us are clearly set forth in the language of IGRA itself.
Intended to ‘promot[e] tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments,
IGRA seeks to ‘ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of the gaming operation.’”)
(quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(1)–(2) (2012)).
135
Wilson, 37 F.3d at 433–35. The federal interest was held to be ensuring that the IGRA
succeeded in its stated purpose “to ‘promot[e] tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and
strong tribal governments,’ . . . [and thus] to “ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of
the gaming operation.” Id. at 433 (quoting 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(1)–(2) (2012)). The federal interest was
stymied by the State’s tax, especially when it was determined that the State collected more revenue
from the gaming operations than the Tribes did. Id. at 433. The Tribal interest was determined to be the
“commitment to operation of their gaming operations.” Id. at 435 (quoting the lower court’s correct
interest assessment in Cabazon Band of Indians v. California, 788 F. Supp. 1513, 1521 (E.D. Cal.
1992)). It was determined that whether or not the value of gaming operations occurred on or off the
reservation was inconsequential.

[T]he Bands have invested significant funds and effort to construct and to operate
wagering facilities and to attract patrons. It is not necessary . . . that the entire value
of the on-reservation activity come from within the reservation’s borders. It is
sufficient that the Bands have made a substantial investment in the gaming
operations and are not merely serving as a conduit for the products of others.
Id. at 435. Finally, the State’s interest was decided to be the uniform regulation of off track gaming
operations. Id. While valid, the state interest is weakened “because IGRA specifically recognizes such
state regulation and establishes a mechanism—the compacts—by which [the Tribes] can reimburse the
State for regulatory costs, outside of the State tax structure.” Id. “The express objectives of IGRA,
when combined with the Bands’ interests, preclude the application of the State’s license fee.” Id.
136
528 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2008).
137
Id. at 1186.
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holding that the
IGRA’s comprehensive regulation of Indian gaming does not
occupy the field with respect to sales taxes imposed on thirdparty purchases of equipment used to construct the gaming
facilities. IGRA’s core objective is to regulate how Indian
casinos function so as to “assure the gaming is conducted
fairly and honestly by both the operator and players.”138
The outcomes in Wilson and Yee demonstrate that the IGRA explicitly
preempts state taxes that are directly levied on a Tribe’s gaming
operations.139 A Court must decide what constitutes a gaming operation
and whether or not the federal interest in the IGRA is targeted toward the
activity that the state is attempting to tax.
In this case, it must be decided whether the property tax impacts a
gaming operation intended to be exclusively regulated by the federal
government under the IGRA. If the answer is yes, then there would be
almost no state interest strong enough to defeat the federal interest in
regulating Indian gaming operations. Pequot III, in deciding that the IGRA
was not applicable to the case at hand, conceded this point when they
adopted the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Whitney, agreeing that under the
IGRA “the only method by which a state can apply its general civil laws to
gaming is through a tribal-state compact.”140 Rather than engage in a
lengthy discussion of whether or not the property tax infringes on the
federal government’s IGRA interest, Pequot III states unequivocally that
“under IGRA, mere ownership of slot machines by the vendors does not
qualify as gaming, and taxing such ownership therefore does not interfere
138
Id. at 1193. Of course, this conveniently leaves out the IGRA’s very relevant core objectives of
encouraging Tribal economic development and ensuring that the Tribe is the primary beneficiary of the
gaming operation.
139
While Wilson is almost certainly correct in its interpretation of the federal interest implicated
in the IGRA, there has been some criticism of the decision in Yee.

What struck me in the opinion was the anti-tribal tone of the decision. After
mentioning that the tribe’s “right of territorial autonomy is significantly
compromised by the Tribe’s invitation to the non-Indian subcontractor to
theoretically consummate purchases on its tribal land for the sole purpose of
receiving preferential tax treatment,” the court added that the tribal interest in
economic self-sufficiency was diminished because the commercial activity was
“rigged” to trigger a tax exemption, and that such tribal interest “lessens in the
specific context of a multi-million casino expansion.” Finally the court mentioned
that the state did have a strong interest in preventing an Indian casino from
“manipulating” its tax laws to shop tax exemptions to local businesses.
Alex Tallchief Skibine, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act at 25: Successes, Shortcomings, and
Dilemmas, 60 FED. LAW., Apr. 2013, at 35, 39. Professor Skibine also compares the dissimilar
preemption outcomes of Yee and Pequot II, albeit very briefly. Id.
140
Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 470 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey &
Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 546 (8th Cir. 1996)).
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with the ‘governance of gaming.’” Pequot II, with equal confidence,
takes the opposite view, stating that the “the instant commercial activity,
the leasing of class III gaming equipment, is not peripheral to IGRA’s core
objective, the regulation of the functioning of the Tribe's casino.”142
Neither court substantially supports their conclusions, though they are
certainly right to do so since there is no binding support for either
determination. The question of whether the leasing of slot machines from
non-Indian vendors qualifies as a gaming operation is one of first
impression.
Pequot III cites to Yee in determining that the tax was not preempted
by the IGRA.143 In holding that the IGRA “does not occupy the field with
respect to sales taxes imposed on third-party purchases,”144 the Ninth
Circuit in Yee decided that the IGRA was not indicative of a federal
interest in preempting a sales tax imposed on a non-Indian party contracted
by a Tribe to build a gaming facility.145 The Tribal-State compact was not
evaluated as part of the IGRA preemption analysis in Yee, as the court
determined the issue was “outside the scope of the compact.”146 Yee quotes
In re Indian Gaming Related Cases147 to support this conclusion, saying
“[s]tates cannot insist that compacts include provisions addressing subjects
that are only indirectly related to the operation of gaming facilities.”148 Yee
relies on In re to exclude the compact from consideration altogether,
presumably because it is the Ninth Circuit’s view that the taxation of
property used to construct a casino on a reservation cannot be related to
gaming activities and is therefore not includable in a compact. The reliance
on In re to exclude the compact is unusual, especially considering that the
opinion interpreted direct relationships to gaming activity “broadly.”149 In
141

Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 470.
Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342 at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012).
143
Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 470.
144
Yee, 528 F.3d at 1193.
145
Id. (“Extending IGRA to preempt any commercial activity remotely related to Indian
gaming—employment contracts, food service contracts, innkeeper codes—stretches the statute beyond
its stated purpose.”).
146
Id. at 1193 n.4. In this footnote, the Court reaffirmed its stance that “[t]he question before us is
properly framed as a tax levied on a non-Indian tribe.” Presumably, they meant to frame the issue as a
tax on a non-Indian contractor.
147
147 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
148
Yee, 528 F.3d at 1193 n.4 (quoting In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 147 F. Supp. 2d at
1018).
149
In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 147 F. Supp. 2d at 1017–18. (“The Court reads §
2710(d)(3)(C), and specifically § 2710(d)(3)(C)(vii), more broadly than [the Tribal plaintiff] does. The
committee report of the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs describes the subparts of §
2710(d)(3)(C) as ‘broad areas.’ See S. Rep. No. 100-446, at 14 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3071, 3084. Consistent with this description, the Court interprets ‘subjects that are directly related to
the operation of gaming activities’ to include any subject that is directly connected to the operation of
gaming facilities.”).
142
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re Indian Gaming Related Cases advocates the position that, while states
should not be allowed to insist on provisions indirectly related to gaming,
the language of a compact should absolutely be considered in cases where
the Tribe agrees with the state on substantial terms related to gaming in a
fairly negotiated compact under the IGRA, even in cases were those terms
favor the state. Yee provided insufficient justification for concluding that
casino construction was unrelated to gaming, and Pequot III’s IGRA
analysis suffers for its reliance on Yee.150
Assuming the interpretation of a compact is germane to an IGRA
preemption consideration, it is important to revisit the Gaming Procedures
governing the relationship between Connecticut and the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe. The Gaming Procedures define a gaming operation as “any
enterprise operated by the Tribe on its Reservation for the conduct of any
form of Class III gaming in any gaming facility.”151 The Gaming
Procedures prohibit the state from taxing a gaming operation, unless
explicitly authorized in the section allowing the state to assess and collect
the cost of regulatory expenses.152 It follows from the “gaming operation”
definition that slot machines, a necessary tool for Class III gaming, would
be considered a part of a gaming operation. The crucial question is whether
leasing Class III gaming equipment is part of a gaming operation. If it is,
then a property tax on that equipment ought to be preempted under the
IGRA.
Ultimately there is no right or wrong answer, at least where controlling
precedent is concerned. Pequot II was correct in holding that the tax
impacted an aspect of the Tribe’s gaming operations.153 After all, the
possession of slot machines is the first, most necessary step to participating
in a Class III gaming operation permitted under the IGRA. Pequot III,
meanwhile, is correct in holding that the tax is to be levied on the nonIndian lessors of the slot machines rather than the Tribe, while
simultaneously acknowledging that the Gaming Procedures forbid state
taxation of a gaming operation not explicitly outlined within the Gaming

150

Pequot III, 722 F.3d 457, 470 (2d Cir. 2013).
Gaming Procedures, supra note 40, at 5. An “enterprise” is defined as “any individual, trust,
corporation, partnership, or other legal entity of any kind other than a tribal enterprise wholly owned by
the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe.” Id. at 4.
152
Id. at 50–51 (“Nothing in this Compact shall be deemed to authorize the State to impose any
tax, fee, charge or assessment upon the Tribe or any Tribal gaming operation except for charges
expressly authorized pursuant to section 11 of this Compact.”).
153
Pequot II, No. 3:06cv10-12, 2012 WL 1069342 at *9 (D. Conn. Mar. 27, 2012) (“However,
the instant commercial activity, the leasing of class III gaming equipment, is not peripheral to IGRA’s
core objective, the regulation of the functioning of the Tribe’s casino. The fact that the Gaming
Procedures afford the State authority to register and investigate vendors of the class III gaming
equipment reflects that the leasing of the equipment is within IGRA’s protective framework and
constitutes engaging in class III gaming.”).
151
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Procedures.
Under Dorsey & Whitney, this caveat in the Gaming
Procedures would support the arguments of the Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe, but only if the deciding Court agrees that non-Indian vendor slot
machine leasing is connected to the gaming operation.155 If one were to
decide the case with Yee as precedent, it can be fairly concluded that the
taxation of property owned by non-Indians is always unaffected by the
IGRA and could only be preempted under a Bracker test, even in cases
where that property is involved in a gaming operation. But Yee failed to
consider the economic purpose of the IGRA or to adequately justify its
conclusion that casino construction was outside the scope of the IGRA, and
it is reasonable to conclude, even under Yee’s improperly narrow
interpretation, that the possession of the slot machines for a gaming
purpose by the Tribe is within the regulatory control of the IGRA.
As a weight in a Bracker analysis, it is significant that the IGRA
requires a state to participate in the regulation of the Tribe’s gaming
operation through the negotiation process,156 whereas other statutes, like
the Indian Trader Statutes, give exclusive regulatory responsibility to the
federal government.157 The absence of state participation in the taxed
activities in Bracker and Ramah weighed heavily against the state interest
in imposing the tax. Connecticut is not a bystander in the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe’s gaming operation, but neither is it uncompensated for its
participation.158 The Gaming Procedures provide procedures for the state to
be reimbursed for their services to the Tribe, and clearly forbid any other
state taxation on a gaming operation. As the state cannot claim to be
levying the tax to recoup on services provided to the Tribe, and because the
slot machines are so integral to the existence of the Tribe’s Class III
gaming operation, the participation of the state in the gaming process is not
a significant factor in either the Bracker balancing test or the IGRA
154
Pequot III, 722 F.3d at 470–71 (“While the Gaming Procedures prohibit State taxation of ‘any
Tribal gaming operation’ other than those explicitly permitted, Gaming Procedures § 17(f), they are
silent as to taxes imposed on a third party’s ownership of slot machines on the Tribe’s land, which, as
explained above, is not ‘gaming.’ Absent the Gaming Procedures, IGRA would not preempt the tax.
With the Gaming Procedures, which are silent on the question of state taxation of the vendor’s
property, the analysis is unchanged.”).
155
Gaming Corp. of Am. v. Dorsey & Whitney, 88 F.3d 536, 546 (8th Cir. 1996) (“Congress thus
left states with no regulatory role over gaming except as expressly authorized by IGRA, and under it,
the only method by which a state can apply its general civil laws to gaming is through a tribal-state
compact. Tribal-state compacts are at the core of the scheme Congress developed to balance the
interests of the federal government, the states, and the tribes.”).
156
See supra notes 31–42 (recounting the IGRA mandated negotiation process between
Connecticut and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe).
157
See supra Part III.B (discussing the Indian Trader Statutes).
158
Gaming Procedures, supra note 40, at 37–39 (providing the procedure by which Connecticut
will “annually make an assessment sufficient to compensate the State for the reasonable and necessary
costs of regulating gaming operations and conducting law enforcement investigations pursuant to this
compact”).
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preemption analysis.
There is no controlling precedent or bright-line rule for how far the
preemptive power of the IGRA goes, so both Pequot II and Pequot III
enjoy the privilege of being technically correct with their interpretations of
the interests manifested by the IGRA. The IGRA was not written to protect
non-Indian vendors from state taxation, but it was written to protect the
economic development of a Tribe’s gaming industry.159 In this case, I
believe the economic purpose of the IGRA and the language of the Gaming
Procedures is sufficient to preempt Connecticut’s property tax without
weighing the interests in a Bracker analysis.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court today would almost certainly agree with the
opinion in Pequot III. After all, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals made
an appropriate ruling based on their evaluation of the federal, state, and
Tribal interests at stake. While Pequot III applied the law in a perfectly
reasonable way, Pequot II offers what I believe to be the more convincing
opinion.
The revitalization of the Indian Tribes is arguably the central
motivation behind the IGRA, which was developed to make it especially
easy for Tribes to participate in the gaming industry.160 It follows that the
preemption of state taxes affecting that gaming industry, however slightly,
would be implicit in the IGRA’s goal of economic development. The
IGRA’s preemptive power is augmented when, as in this case, the
negotiated Tribal-State gaming compact explicitly details how the state
will be reimbursed for the regulatory costs associated with the Tribe’s
gaming operation and rejects all other taxation.
Given the increasingly minute importance afforded to Tribal
sovereignty, it may simply be the rule that the right of a state to tax an
activity with a minimal nexus cannot be defeated by the existence of
federal oversight. Of course, future judges may choose to reintroduce and
reinvigorate the importance of protecting Tribal sovereignty and reverse
the marginalization of what was once an important facet of federal
supremacy.

159
25 U.S.C. § 2702 (2012) (stating that the IGRA’s purpose included providing the “means of
promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments . . . .”).
160
See supra notes 124–27 (discussing the IGRA’s purpose and gaming provisions).

